ANALISIS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH DI INDONESIA

Abstract

Mudharabah contract is a core product of Islamic Banking, which is still very small. As a cooperation contract that brings together two different parties, the mudharabah financing contract needs to include the agreement and terms of both parties. For this reason, this contract prioritizes honesty and trustworthiness to avoid asymmetric information or unbalanced information where the agent has more information than the principal so that the agent has the potential to make deviations. In this study, the authors formulate problems that include how asymmetric information occurs in mudharabah financing and how to reduce the asymmetric information in mudharabah financing. This research was conducted to show the results of the above problem formulation with a qualitative method with data sources that come from primary and secondary data and then analyzed by qualitative descriptive analysis techniques. The authors' results are information concealment, the character of customers who are challenging to know the truth, and the error of analysis is asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection. The deviation in using funds is asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard. The problem of asymmetric information can lead to the risk of default and a decrease in financing quality. To overcome this problem, Islamic banking needs to conduct screening, verification, monitoring, and improve the application of sharia ethics.